In this article, Professor
INTRODUCTION
Few topics have captured the legal community's imagination and invoked such passion as the recent debate over the use of foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court justices have publicly debated the topic. 3 Congress has attempted to enact sweeping laws UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 tices who dare cite to foreign opinions, remarkably suggesting that its use is evidence of intellectual inferiority.
10
Bereft of nuance, this debate has become one of stark absolutes. Those who condemn the practice of citing to foreign law argue that its use should be banned in toto. 11 They variously assert that citation to foreign law undermines (1) the Court's legitimacy by impermissibly expanding judicial discretion and (2) our national and democratic sovereignty. 12 On the other hand, despite numerous writings extolling the virtues of comparative constitutionalism, 13 the amount of recent scholarship that strongly advocates the use of foreign sources, while also providing a theory justifying that use, is meager.
14 Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedyoften seen as the leading proponents for citing foreign sources-respond (suggesting that "it seems at best pointless, and at worst destructive, to give weight to decisions reached by international tribunals that, by their very nature, cannot give due regard to differences among cultures").
10. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 37 (arguing that "Justice Kennedy is not Justice Scalia's intellectual peer, and it is hard to extract much of a guiding theory-in the sense of knowing when such legal materials may be used and when they may not-from Justice Kennedy's unedifying admixture of piety, vacuity, earnestness, idealism, and platitude").
11. Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1763, 1765 (2004) (describing Scalia's "categorical rejection of all sources outside of the tradition" and noting that "his attachment to local tradition and history involves more than just a preference for a particular approach to substantive due process; it bespeaks as well hostility towards any judicial reliance on transnational norms of constitutional understanding"); see also Anderson, supra note 9.
12. defensively, if not with bewilderment, as to why the debate ensues.
15
Rarely do they or other proponents affirmatively articulate why the arguments opposing the use of foreign law are unfounded on their own terms. And often the scholarship fails to explain how the use of foreign law should be commended as being consistent with American constitutionalism. 16 Yet it is consistent. Stripped of its rhetoric, the hostility towards citing foreign decisions in any context seems misplaced. Those who oppose the use of foreign law confuse the question of validity with the question of what weight to afford that law. The critics also ignore a history of practice in which foreign legal materials have been used in constitutional analysis. 17 Indeed, the practice is one our state courts have long embraced when interpreting their own, unique state constitutions, a point that until now has been downplayed. Lurking under the surface of arguments made by those who oppose the use of foreign sources appears to be the hubris of American exceptionalism. More fundamentally, the arguments often reflect particular modes of constitutional interpretationtextualism and originalism-that, despite recent attempts to resuscitate, the legal mainstream long ago rejected or discounted, at least in their extreme forms. 18 A need therefore remains to explain not only why the use of foreign law is not offensive, but why its use is consistent with American constitutionalism and the proper role of the judiciary. This article attempts to do exactly that. This is not an academic exercise: explaining why the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign law is legitimate, while debunking arguments that categorically reject its use, is important. The spirited backlash against the judiciary for citing to foreign materials as persuasive authority threatens to have a chilling effect. 19 Instead of exploring how to utilize foreign materials in a refined way, the debate has been debased to an all-15. Anderson, supra note 9, at 34, 39. 16. Alford, In Search of a Theory, supra note 9, at 639 (explaining that proponents of the practice of citing to foreign or international materials "rarely offer a firm theoretical justification for the practice"); Taavi 19. The last time Justice Scalia vigorously attacked a citation practice-the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation-he had a significant impact in reducing the practice. See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999) (concluding that Justice Scalia's acerbic criticism of the reliance on legislative history led to an overall decline in the use of that interpretive tool). For an explanation of why the Court might start using foreign materials silently, even when the use is legitimate, see Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 1125-27 (1995) (arguing that an "appearance factor" influences decision making). UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 or-nothing proposition, with extreme and fringe positions obtaining a degree of superficial credibility. The result is problematic, and its impact real. Lessons that could be learned from other countries are missed. Moreover, the Court's failure to engage more meaningfully with foreign law divorces the Court from an ongoing transnational dialogue that is developing and shaping international norms-norms that, one day, may exert some control domestically. This article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the current debate and how it has unfolded in the last few years. Part II explores the validity of arguments championed by those who oppose citation to foreign law sources and explains why those arguments are misplaced. Contrary to the positions staked in the flood of critical articles published in 2005, the use of foreign law is hardly an offensive practice. Part III explains why citation to foreign law is consistent with American constitutionalism and explores some pragmatic reasons for why the U.S. Supreme Court's use of foreign law is sensible. The article concludes by suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court should continue cautiously to use foreign law as persuasive authority. Engaging in transnational constitutional dialogue is a commendable goal, not an illegitimate one.
I. BACKGROUND
The citation to foreign law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions is not a new phenomenon, but the debate over its use has only recently become bitter. The debate has proceeded on two fronts. One front is in the political arena, where elected officials and pundits have attacked vigorously the judiciary's use of foreign law. 20 The other front is in the nation's law schools. Last year, a slew of academic scholarship condemned the Court's use of foreign law as persuasive authority. 21 
A. Use of Foreign Law: A Recent History
The debate reached a highpoint after the U.S. Supreme Court cited to foreign law in four well-publicized, controversial decisions in "hotly contested areas of constitutional law" involving capital punishment, gay rights, and affirmative action. 22 First, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that executing mentally disabled persons violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 23 In so For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of judicial review had no precedents to look to save their own, because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority. . . . But now that the constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.
45
The justices' remarks have met with fierce criticism, and even death threats. Chief Justice Roberts's confirmation hearings, one Senator suggested that citation to foreign sources should constitute an impeachable offense. 50 Senators reaffirmed this sentiment in Justice Alito's hearings.
51
The national media has actively chronicled the debate, with newspapers routinely discussing the practice, and politicians and pundits weighing in with their opinions. 52 At times, the criticism has had a xenophobic tone to it, playing on "exaggerated fears: fear of foreign domination, fear of judicial activism, fear of the unknown. The debate's strident nature has puzzled foreign scholars in other countries. Other nations' courts often cite to foreign materials. 61 The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, cited to at least one British case in about 45% of their decisions between 1984 and 1995, and had at least one citation to a U.S. case in nearly 30% of their decisions. 62 Even as a "uniquely Canadian body of law" has grown, the Canadian Supreme Court's use of foreign law has "increased in frequency and diversity." 63 Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court frequently cites to foreign materials. 64 In fact, the "South African Constitution explicitly requires that international law be taken into account when interpreting constitutional rights and specifically authorizes its courts to consider foreign law . . . ." wide. 67 Compared to other western democracies, the American practice has become increasingly isolated as an extreme version of provincialism.
68

B. The Scholarly Debate
With this background, it is useful to understand how the scholarly debate has unfolded. First, what is the debate not about? No one argues that foreign institutions should control constitutional meaning. Jurists and scholars do not suggest-indeed would be foolish to suggest-that
• foreign rulings are legally binding on American courts; 69 or
• courts may impose foreign perspectives upon Americans through constitutional interpretation.
70
Nor is this particular debate about whether international law and norms can become authoritative in U.S. constitutional adjudication. 71 Rather, 68. Ackerman, supra note 13, at 772-73. 69. Levinson, supra note 62, at 353 ("One obviously need not believe that there is an obligation to be bound by that foreign experience-indeed, I know of no one who makes such a foolish argument . . . ."); Wells, supra note 9, at 429 ("Since nobody asserts that these rules are legally binding on American courts . . ."); Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 3, at 266 ("But comparative use of foreign constitutional decisions will not lead us blindly to follow the foreign court. As I have said before-'we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations . . . .'"). This is not entirely true for international norms, which some scholars occasionally argue should be presumptively controlling in certain circumstances. Opponents of the use of foreign law sources answer yes, and base their opposition on two principal arguments. First, some scholars argue that citing to foreign law undermines judicial legitimacy by impermissibly expanding judicial discretion. 74 Justice Scalia, for example, asserts that using foreign sources threatens the Court's legitimacy by implicating personal value judgments as to which foreign law to cite. 75 His argument is an extension of originalism: the judiciary is an undemocratic institution within a political system whose legitimacy is derived from the consent of the governed. 76 To overcome a threat of illegitimacy, the argument goes, the Court must adhere closely to the text and the original intent of those upon whose authority the legitimacy of the text rests.
77 "A court that moves beyond the formalism of the text and the boundaries of original history has exited the objective domain of law and has entered the subjective enterprise of politics."
78
Others have made the same point in slightly different ways. Kenneth Anderson argues that citing to foreign law invites "judges to 'troll deeply . . . in the world's corpus juris' to reach a politically preferred outcome," 79 a practice which "swings wide the door for the exercise of judges' purely private sensibilities as public justices . . . [which is] unconstrained and unconstrainable." 80 In his recent confirmation hearings, (1997) (arguing that customary international law is "presumptively incorporated into the U.S. domestic legal system and given effect as rules of federal law").
72. Uniformly, all agree that foreign and international law is relevant in the "interpretation of statutes, conventions, international agreements, and so on." Anderson, supra note 9, at 34 n.2. Scholars disagree about the use of foreign law in constitutional cases. It is a confirmation of Justice Scalia's view that the leading opinions featuring comparative constitutionalism-those of Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy-are animated by exactly the judicial philosophies which, with respect to the rhetoric of judging, are the least constrained. Either the citation of foreign and international legal materials will come to nothing-it will mean nothingor else, far more likely, it will open up whole new areas of rhetorical possibility. How can it be otherwise? There is nothing internal here, whether in principle or in practice, that acts to constrain.
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Chief Justice Roberts suggested that relying on foreign precedent allows a judge "to incorporate his or her own personal preferences, [and] cloak them with the authority of precedent." 81 He explained it this way: [R]elying on foreign precedent doesn't confine judges. It doesn't limit their discretion the way relying on domestic precedent does. . . . Foreign law, you can find anything you want. If you don't find it in the decisions of France or Italy, it's in the decisions of Somalia or Japan or Indonesia, or wherever. As somebody said in another context, looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find them. They're there. 82 Judge Richard Posner, in the 2005 Harvard Law Review Forward, summed up the concern, suggesting that using foreign law "opens up" "promiscuous opportunities." 83 Second, some argue that citing foreign law is somehow inconsistent with sovereignty. 84 Sovereigntists 85 bristle at the idea that U.S. sovereignty may be impinged upon, and they therefore attempt to firmly locate the U.S. Constitution in peculiarly American realities and dismiss the idea that decisions from other courts in other countries may be illuminating. 86 Sujit Choudhry has described this view as legal particularism in its mild form and legal hegemony in its extreme version. 87 In many ways, both arguments are cut from the same cloth. Roger Alford has referred to it as the "international countermajoritarian difficulty":
91 the notion that "federal judges will impose a particular elite's view of good law on a public that might disagree if it understood what was at stake."
92 Ken Kersch, a political scientist from Princeton, has employed harsher words, arguing that use of foreign materials "is part of an elite-driven, politically-motivated worldwide trend toward judicial governance, which is antithetical to democratic self-rule, if not to the rule of law itself."
93 For others, the crux is more banal: unless judges confine themselves to original constitutional understandings, they act illegitimately and undemocratically. 94 
II. CRITIQUING THE SOVEREIGNTISTS
The recent barrage of scholarship attacking the use of foreign law was shrill. But was there substance to the arguments? Should courts stop cautiously using foreign law and instead categorically bar its use? When closely examined, the positions taken by those who oppose ever citing to foreign law in constitutional adjudication seem particularly dubious.
A. Confusing Weight and Validity
As an initial matter, scholars who believe that citation to foreign sources is never appropriate often confuse the issues of weight and valid- 100. See also Ackerman, supra note 13, at 771, 774 (encouraging academia to think about world constitutionalism without "kill[ing] the field by overenthusiastic embrace"); Jacobsohn, supra note 11, at 1767 ("taking seriously" concerns of cultural particularism but arguing that it "should not preclude courts from seeking constitutional convergence of legal systems in the incremental and proximate fulfillment of transcendent norms of constitutionalism").
101 ) (explaining that "we need to approach foreign subjects with an even greater tentativeness of theoretical construct and with an even greater self-consciousness than we would subjects closer to home" and calling for a "careful, contextualized consideration"); Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 26 (1998) (arguing that judges "must ensure that foreign reasoning is not imported without sufficient consideration of the context in which it is being applied" because "solutions developed in one jurisdiction may be inappropriate elsewhere"); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional Categories, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 865, 880 (1993) (describing how "constitutional constraints rest on culturally contingent social categories" and how constitutional interpretation must vary according to cultural history and national differences). UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 cial conditions that makes the local and the foreign system different enough to render interpretative inspiration impracticable.
103
Certainly, the "persuasive value of a foreign source will depend on a combination of its reasoning, the comparability of contexts, and its institutional origin." 104 At times, foreign law may play a very minor, suppletive role, or no role at all. But recognizing that foreign sources may be entitled to less weight than other sources is a far cry from barring foreign sources from constitutional adjudication.
Kenneth debate is "not whether it is good to look abroad or not, but rather whether, in a particular case, it is done well or done poorly," then there is really no debate.
113
To be fair, Anderson seems aware of this criticism because he later suggests that the weight of any given foreign authority is too difficult to assess. 114 Which is entitled to greater weight, he rhetorically poses, "the German constitutional court [or] the high court of India?" 115 Because of that difficulty, Anderson suggests "a judge can use any of this material how he or she will." 116 The worry of cherry picking is a legitimate concern. Yet Anderson does not explain, and frankly cannot explain, how this is different in kind from citation to a whole host of other sources that the Supreme Court uses regularly, tendentiously or not, without comment.
117
Constitutional interpretation already permits judges wide leeway, requiring selection of arguments from "text, intent, precedent, history, structure, value, and pragmatic consequences."
118 Judges also commonly cite to secondary authorities, such as "scholarly treatises, legal encyclopedias, 'restatements' of the case law, legislative committee reports, law review articles, legal dictionaries, and even, on occasion, books and articles that are completely outside 'the law.'" 119 The Court has been known to star-stud its opinions with citation to sources ranging from M* to popular music and poetry, 120 and to works of Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Montesquieu, and others. 121 Even extralegal sources, such as the "views of private groups or individuals," are sometimes cited to support a decision.
122 Judges can use this material in any manner they wish. And like foreign materials, this authority often is used only persuasively to support an opinion the Court had arrived at independently.
123
Not only are the sources of authority vast for the modern court, so too is the substance. As law becomes increasingly interdisciplinary, "courts must inevitably dabble in a wide range of disciplines in which they may lack training or expertise-for example, economics in antitrust cases, science and engineering in patent cases, psychology in criminal cases."
124 Yet in none of these circumstances, do courts entirely ignore the complicated interdisciplinary material, even if its weight is indeterminate.
125
In fact, many respected commentators have explained how unconstrained and unconstrainable the use of history is in originalist constitutional interpretation.
126
But this difficulty does not bar the court from engaging with, and relying on, the historical information. 130 He explains that the Court cites to "the practice of foreign jurisdictions without examining the whys and wherefores underlying those practices."
131 Young is certainly correct in his conclusion that uncritical use is undesirable. But the proper conclusion is not, as Young implies, that foreign law should never be cited. Instead, his argument suggests that foreign law should be used in a more developed way. In fact, the nose-counting problem suggests that foreign law should be discussed in greater depth and with more sophistication, not less. The problem is not that foreign law is used, but rather that it is used inadequately or superficially.
A related Sovereigntist concern is that foreign law is too difficult to determine. 132 This concern similarly suffers from a weight versus validity problem. At most, concluding that foreign law is difficult to ascertain suggests that judges should use caution. No per se rule of exclusion from judicial deliberations is warranted, however, simply because something may be difficult to ascertain. 133 For instance, discerning legislative intent is classically difficult, but something courts attempt all the time. 134 The concern that foreign law is difficult to ascertain is, in any case, exaggerated. 135 The legal community is better positioned now than it has was originally published in 1950 as part of a White House conference on the welfare of children. 135. Anderson, supra note 9; Sanchez, supra note 9, at 40 (arguing the problem is with an "unelected judge whose true area of expertise is U.S. law and who lacks access to adequate resources for research on foreign law and culture"); Young, supra note 90, at 138. Posner, supra note 9, at 80 (noting "the growing literature on constitutional courts in other countries-a literature that is growing in part because the number and activity of such courts are growing").
139. Reimann, supra note 136, at 675 (citations omitted). With the assistance of an expert (preferably one schooled in the language, culture, and law of the foreign country), or even without one, this process of comparison and analogical reasoning is nothing new to the judge. The judge of the future, and the lawyer of today, has practiced law or taught law in the era of globalization, when a lawyer must be familiar with some aspects of foreign law.
Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Role of Foreign Languages in Educating Lawyers for Transnational Challenges
143
Even without experts, courts can draw from an ever-increasing number of amicus briefs to gauge the soundness of arguments, 144 even those based on foreign law. 145 In short, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has noted: "[t]oday, tools are readily at hand to pursue international and comparative law inquiries."
146
Perhaps an obvious retort is to ask exactly what weight to afford foreign law in any particular case. Many scholars have grappled with this worthwhile question. In a seminal article, 147 Sujit Choudhry described different ways that foreign law can be used in constitutional adjudication. 148 Likewise, David Fontana has crafted a typology of uses. 149 He concludes that foreign sources may be used appropriately in "hard cases"
150 when there are no helpful American judicial precedents, when the American sources are unclear, and when the foreign sources aid to craft a rule or standard. 151 In similar fashion, Joan Larsen has attempted to describe the different uses of foreign law-expository, empirical, and moral fact finding-and then normatively evaluate those uses. 152 Although the approaches are varied, generally at least three factors are recognized as determining the weight and applicability of foreign law. 156 First, a court must consider the historical connection between the two countries-whether "for a considerable time the two systems had the same sources from which they derived their legal doctrines, principles, procedures, methods, and ideas."
157 Second, a court should evaluate the similarity between the legal systems. 158 Third, the court must decide whether the constitutional institutions are analogous.
159 Strikingly, however, the recent literature denunciating the use of foreign law largely ignores this scholarship. Justice Scalia and "his supporters from the sidelines" would ignore this nuance in preference for an absolute rule.
160
B. An Attack on Sovereignty?
A second criticism that Sovereigntists commonly proffer is that use of foreign law "surrenders U.S. sovereignty to non-U.S. decisionmakers" who are not accountable to the people of the United States. The point, at least superficially, seems an obvious one: "[t]o the extent that a state is subject to law made elsewhere, it has lost its sovereignty, and, perhaps, in some deep way, its right to call itself a 'state.'" 162 True, perhaps; but as a reason for categorically barring the use of foreign law, nonsense.
As an initial matter, the argument fundamentally misconceives the nature of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the right to independence, "that is the right to exercise, within a portion of the globe and to the exclusion of other States, the functions of a State." 163 Sovereignty embodies the right "to be left alone, to exclude, to be free from any external meddling or interference." 164 Sovereignty is, therefore, what a nation makes of it. It cannot be "violated if a nation, through one of its branches, executive, legislative, or judicial, makes an autonomous decision to align its laws with other nations. This choice, exercised independently of other nations, constitutes an exercise of, and not a violation of, a state's right to self-determination." 165 To "acknowledge the propriety of comparative analysis hardly entails a surrender of sovereignty." 166 Similarly, the idea that somehow the Court is bowing to the whims of foreigners and thereby endangering sovereignty is simply untrue. 167 That suggestion confuses the use of foreign law as an interpretative aid with presuming that foreign law is controlling. The suspicion that the Court is using foreign sources for something more than persuasive authority is sheer speculation. 168 The Court "may be seeking information, guidance, stimulation, clarification, or even enlightenment," but there is no evidence that it turns to foreign law for binding authority. 169 The UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 Court's use of foreign law is a recognition only that "no [nation] is so unique that it has neither anything to say to, or learn from, other [nations]." 170 Alexander Aleinikoff has made a more cutting, if not fundamental, point. As Aleinikoff explains, the Sovereigntist objection to using foreign law because of sovereignty loss, "starts with an unrealistic view of states as hermetically sealed polities exercising sole jurisdiction over their territory and people." 171 This version of sovereignty "does not exist and perhaps has never existed."
172 Constitutional law is "not free from outside influences; nor has it ever been." 173 Perhaps more telling, states are often subject to laws, directly or indirectly, to which the state did not expressly consent. This can be either in the form of customary international norms 174 or through other states extraterritorially applying their laws. 175 That so many politicians appear concerned about the possibility that courts could be influenced by law made elsewhere is ironic: the United States attempts to impose its law abroad all the time. 176 The United States routinely discounts or disregards the sovereignty of other nations. 177 Setting aside recent military operations, the disregard is evident in how the law permits broad jurisdictional assertions over foreigners on suspect bases, 178 and our increased willingness to apply our laws extraterritorially. 179 Even the U.S. judiciary all-too-often tends to ignore the impact its decisions have on other countries and legal systems. too late). Globalization of the judiciary and constitutional decision making is here and will surely continue. 181 To the extent that the lines between the domestic and the foreign have blurred, it has occurred already. 182 Transnational and global litigation is part of our court system, 183 and the United States is becoming "more vulnerable to the imposition of international norms."
184
"As community boundaries diverge from national ones, law making may migrate from national institutions toward global ones." 185 Having domestic courts engage with foreign or transnational materials, then, may be a way for us to shape that law as we see fit. But ignoring it will not make it go away. In this context, engaging with foreign law and using it in constitutional decision making may ultimately help shore up U.S. sovereignty, rather than erode it.
C. Old Wine, New Bottles: Originalism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
If the Sovereigntists are not lamenting the loss of national sovereignty, then their indictment often mirrors longstanding debates over certain kinds of constitutional interpretation.
186
Sovereigntists believe that citation to foreign sources permits judges to engage in inappropriate policymaking. 187 Largely, then, the rejection of the use of foreign materials rests on the argument that judges must confine themselves to considering the original intention of the Framers when deciding constitutional cases, something foreign law has little to say about. Naturally, "[o]riginalism and textualism are particularly incompatible with comparative analysis" 188 because comparativism is not bound by history or text. But why should these theories stop the U.S. Supreme Court from continuing to use foreign sources?
As a preliminary matter, originalism-in its extreme form-has been "widely critiqued as unrealistic and unworkable" for a variety of 191 Historians have questioned whether, at the time of ratification, constitutional language like "equality" and "liberty" even had a fixed meaning from which to derive original understanding. 192 Third, that originalism will restrain judges more than other interpretative methodologies is unlikely, and at least, controverted. For many, "original understanding [is] no more than an artifice for imposing [the judge's] own political vision . . . ."
193 At the very least, the countermajoritarian difficulty that lies at the heart of originalist thinking may be overblown. 194. Friedman, supra note 76, at 159. Not long ago, the concern of constitutional theory was not a countermajoritarian difficulty, but a majoritarian one. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1158 ("The question that academics and judges pondered then was not the courts' own legitimacy in a democratic order, but the legitimacy of rule by a majority that, unregulated, threatened little more than mob action."). judges and believe they conform to it." 197 This is not pure conjecture. "[E]mpirical studies of voting patterns of Supreme Court Justices never find that ideology explains anywhere near 100% of the Justices' votes."
198
A particularly apt critique of originalism also exists in circumstances when the history and text are ambiguous. "Methodologically, the doctrine is backwards: as the subjects of debate become more difficult, the need to be open to the widest possible sources increases."
199 Constitutional provisions often do "not have a single, definite meaning in any community prior to the process of interpretation." 200 The constitutional meaning is therefore not a thing waiting to be discovered by a judge. It only has an identifiable shape after the judge articulates the conclusion of an interpretative inquiry. . . .
[I]t is not possible for a judge-or anyone else-to consider the meaning of [constitutional language] without drawing on a wealth of experiences, arguments, and values that range across local, national, and even international communities.
201
Stated differently, foreign materials should not be used when the constitutional text and history speak clearly; 202 but they may be used when the conventional legal materials do not exist, and the justices, "deprived of these crutches," have to make discretionary calls.
203
A more provocative point can be made. Adhering solely to strict originalism in interpreting the Constitution "means accepting the judgments of people who lived centuries ago in a society that was very different from ours." 204 As a society, however, we have far more in commondemographically, culturally, morally, and in our historical experienceswith foreigners in the twenty-first century than we do with Americans of the 1780s or 1860s. 205 Richard Posner, although more recently appearing UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 to repudiate his prior position, 206 has explained how evidence of foreign practices may thus be more relevant than evidence of original intent:
If a law could be said to be contrary to world public opinion I would consider this a reason, not compelling but not negligible either, for regarding a state law as unconstitutional even if the Constitution's text had to be stretched a bit to cover it. The study of other laws, or of world opinion as crystallized in foreign law and practices, is a more profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenthcentury evidence [of the Framers' intent]. 207 Indeed, "[w]hy should we care more about the intent of the Founderswho are long-dead as well as culturally removed from us-than about the understandings of contemporary judges struggling with the same problems . . . ?"
208
But even if one were to accept originalism as the only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation, originalism struggles to explain why citation to foreign sources must be banned in constitutional decision making. The Framers' reliance on international sources should lead "a justice devoted to originalism to look, like the framers themselves, toward-not away from-international opinion."
209 As a historical matter, the use of foreign materials has a "venerable history in constitutional interpretation." 210 The suggestion that citation to foreign law is new and unprecedented 211 is empirically wrong. (2004) (arguing that "the use of international law in constitutional interpretation has a long history, and reflects the Framers' own interest in and concern about international law"); see also JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 13, at v ("Centuries ago scholars and political activists ranging from Aristotle to James Madison compared and analyzed systems of government to determine how best to constitute polities."); Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 56 ("When phrases like 'due process of law,' 'equal protection,' and 'cruel and unusual punishments' are illuminated by parallel rules, empirical evidence, or community standards found in other mature legal systems, that evidence should not simply be ignored. Wise American judges did not do so at the beginning of the Republic, and there is no warrant for them to start now."); cf. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (explaining that judges were to look "to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat").
211. Anderson, supra note 9, at 33 (noting that before Roper "the appearance of foreign law in constitutional decisions [was possibly] nothing more than a minor hobbyhorse for Justice Stephen Breyer or Justice Kennedy"). part, has long been used in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. 213 International law-as distinguished perhaps from all foreign materials-cannot be irrelevant to constitutional interpretation because the U.S. Constitution itself openly refers to international law. 214 The Court itself has recognized its relevance: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."
215 Indeed, ignoring the practices of other countries-according to Professor Harold Hongju Koh-would "constitute a stunning reversal of history."
216 Vicki Jackson has recently made much the same point.
217
Aside from the use of foreign law to decide cases, early American legal scholars were well versed in foreign materials:
Early opinions of the Court and leading treatises of the nineteenth century took international and comparative law far more seriously than courts and scholars in the twentieth century. James Madison studied the constitutions of the world in preparing to write the American document. Early U.S. jurists were schooled on the leading international treatises, the lex mercatoria, the law of prizes, Roman citizenship law, and British constitutionalism.
218
Some commentators have argued that given our constitutional connections with international human rights, the reference to foreign law is par- 216. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 45; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 1989 (noting that " [t] here is nothing terribly new" in looking "at foreign sources of law as aids in constitutional interpretation").
217. Jackson, supra note 55, at 109-11 (explaining that reference to foreign and international law is a "traditional method[] of analysis" and that "references to foreign law go way back in U.S. constitutional history").
218. Aleinikoff, supra note 162, at 1989; see also Levasseur, supra note 212, at 316-24 (explaining how U.S. courts historically referred to foreign law sources); Childress, supra note 58, at 200 (explaining that "before the American Civil War, courts regularly referred to Roman law, civil law (that is, the law of continental Europe), and English common law"). UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 ticularly appropriate when the Court is addressing an issue related to human rights.
219
But whether originalism supports citing to foreign law may be the juridical equivalent of debating how many angels can stand on the head of a pin. If the point is solely that originalism is preferred to other methods of interpretation-the point Justice Scalia seems to make 220 -then the debate is very ordinary indeed. 221 Deciding whether the use of foreign law is appropriate cannot require resolving the difficult and, perhaps, unsolvable question of what method of judicial interpretation is best. The wide-ranging debate over what constitutional interpretation requires has been ongoing for years with no end in sight. Nor is it realistic to believe that judges will universally apply one interpretative approach to all cases. 222 If a judge wishes to embrace a certain interpretative methodology, she should do so on its own terms. But the use of foreign law itself is not a reason for adopting or rejecting a particular interpretative methodology.
D. The Sovereigntist Position: How Extreme?
Before turning to an affirmative explanation for why using foreign sources may well be sensible, one might ask whether the suggestion to ban the use of foreign materials-not to mention, as some senators suggest, to render its use an impeachable offense-is a radical one. Quite radical.
Underscoring the extremity of the Sovereigntist position is not difficult. First, as explained above, the U.S. Supreme Court has used foreign law sources in constitutional analysis since the early days of the Union. 220. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (stating that "such comparative analysis [to international law] is inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution").
221. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 167, at 1277 (arguing that some criticisms of references to non-U.S. law are "entirely parasitic on some other argument-which is merely asserted, not defended" and "deployed in a wide range of contexts, not just this one").
222. Numerous scholars have explained these points.
227
Less known, however, and one of the contributions this article hopes to make to the debate, is how our state court system routinely engages in comparative constitutionalism. The categorical rejection of foreign materials contradicts a practice deeply embedded in our legal system.
Comparative constitutionalism is a hallmark of our state court system. Each of the fifty states-with their own separate judicial systems and constitutional law-extensively cite to one another when interpreting their state constitutions without any hue and cry. 228 The practice has been continuous since the 1800s. 229 State supreme courts not only routinely cite to "foreign" decisions, but actively encourage lawyers appearing before them to rely on those decisions.
230 "The prevailing practice has been for the courts in one state to consider, and often cite in support 361-62 ("United States courts have, from the founding of the nation to the present day, referenced foreign legal sources in a variety of different contexts."); Jackson, supra note 55, at 110-11 n.7 (citing a laundry list of cases showing that references to foreign and international sources "occur episodically in constitutional decisions throughout the Court's history").
224 of their own decisions, the developing jurisprudence in other states. This sort of cross-fertilization has been a distinctive feature of the state constitutional law movement." 231 Judges uniformly find decisions of other state supreme courts-even on constitutional matters-"relevant and appropriate for consideration." 232 One recent study of thirteen state courts of last resort found that over one-third of the decisions involving interpretation of state constitutional provisions included citation to out-of-state authority. 233 In more than three-quarters of those decisions, the courts cited to more than one out-of-state decision. 234 They even, on occasion, cite to other nations' decisions and international law. 235 Of course, when state courts cite to similar decisions from other jurisdictions, they do so only as persuasive authority. 236 Universal agreement exists that "state supreme courts have the unquestioned, final authority to interpret their state constitutions." 237 State "courts seem to consult rulings from other jurisdictions more to educate themselves than to inquire into any authoritative constraints on how they themselves may rule."
238 "[J]udges seek only to gain the benefit of relevant human experience for the purpose of sharpening their own decision making; the consulted ruling carries no more intrinsic weight than would, say, a work of history or a law review article."
239 State courts thus do not consult "foreign" authority with any "belief that judicial rulings from other jurisdictions are in any sense binding within the consulting jurisdiction." The same tradition exists when the state courts have interpreted provisions similar to federal constitutional provisions. In those circumstances, not only do state courts turn to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions for guidance, but the federal interpretation is presumed (rightly or wrongly) correct. 241 "[C]ongruence with federal decisional law is assumed to be the norm, and deviation is for all intents and purposes impossible." 242 Even if this conclusion overgeneralizes, 243 it is widely believed that when interpreting state constitutional provisions, the state court should refer to U.S. Supreme Court and other state court opinions as "important guides on the subjects which they squarely address."
244 Of course, as with state-to-state citation, although citation to the U.S. Supreme Court is common, all recognize that the state courts constitute an "'independent appellate judiciary, and do not exist, when it comes to interpreting the Constitution and the laws of the state, solely to mimic decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.'" 245 If the Sovereigntists are correct-that citation to foreign law undermines court legitimacy-then state courts should never cite to sister UNIVERSITY There is a natural response to this comparison: states share a common history as part of a federalist system, and therefore interstate citation, or even borrowing, does not raise the same problem as the U.S. Supreme Court citing to foreign law. Admittedly, state constitutional provisions are born and developed in a context that the national experience and the experience of sister states influences. But this is a difference of degree, not kind. On the one hand, states are not as similar as one might think. State constitutions are distinctive "in their origins," "their legal premises," and "their history." 247 253 If, as suggested in the debate over citing to foreign law, a constitution is so peculiar to each locality, then surely state courts would have nothing to learn from their sister states-but that has long been found untrue.
On the other hand, the distinctions between the United States and other countries are often overplayed.
The United States has never been a hermetically sealed legal system. It shares a common legal heritage, tradition, and history with many foreign constitutional systems. For that reason, constitutional concepts like "liberty," "equal protection," "due process of law," and privacy have never been exclusive U.S. property, but have long carried global meaning. 254 Moreover, some countries, like Canada, "share a common law heritage in private law in liberal democratic and federal structures of government" and other historical, societal, and legal similarities that make their laws particularly well suited to comparison. 255 Other countries have long borrowed from the U.S. system, and American constitutional precedents have been emulated or adopted abroad, which is another reason why foreign law is often not all that different. 256 In short, that state courts have a rich tradition of comparative constitutionalism reveals that the debate over citing to foreign law is a question only of what weight to afford that law-the very debate that correctly ensues among the states. 257 The real issue is not whether seeking guidance from abroad is ever inappropriate, but whether in any particular case the foreign law is persuasive. UNIVERSITY For all of the deficiencies in the Sovereigntist position, it is still incumbent to explain why use of foreign law as persuasive authority is consistent with American constitutionalism and the proper role of the judiciary. As shown below, one need not flirt with the idea of a universal, natural law that so many find objectionable. One also need not suggest that foreign law should be outcome-determinative, or not take seriously "the particularist perspective on constitutional arrangements as manifestations of key attributes of national identity."
258 Foreign law is persuasive authority: nothing more, nothing less.
259
A. Transparency and Judicial Dialogue
The U.S. Supreme Court should cautiously continue to cite to foreign law because an essential part of judging is citing to authority that the justices use to arrive at their decisions. Our legal system is imbued with the tradition that judges must justify their holdings. 260 In doing so, they must be candid and honest in revealing the sources, and stating the reasons, for their decisions. 261 Transparency is important. 262 The public is entitled to know why the Court ruled a particular way and to be provided the opportunity to subject the reasoning to scrutiny. 263 A decision that accurately reveals the sources upon which it relies also furnishes greater 258. Jacobsohn, supra note 11, at 1767. 259. There are, admittedly, other uses for foreign law. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court should be able to use, and has used, foreign law to explain the effects of a particular interpretation. Larsen, supra note 37, at 1288-91, 1299 (describing a topology of foreign law uses including "expository" and "empirical" approaches). In this situation, the Court is not using the foreign source to aid in interpretation of a domestic constitutional provision. Certainly no objection can exist to using foreign law to describe how the U.S. system is different, and therefore why a contrary result is warranted. Id. at 1299.
260. Choudhry, supra note 64, at 824 (explaining that the Court is "under an obligation to engage in a process of public justification for their own decisions"); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 48 (2002) (explaining the "judiciary's responsibility to communicate clearly with its various audiences as the essential ingredient in achieving the goals of our judicial system"); cf. Friedman guidance for those who seek to discover from the decision what the next case will likely hold. 264 That judges must provide a candid and reasoned explanation of the court's holding is a foundation of American jurisprudence and distinguishes our approach from that taken in countries like France, "where judges typically employ an opinion form that is terse and syllogistic." 265 As Justice Breyer explains: "[a justice's] opinion is meant to reflect [the justice's] actual method of reaching a legal conclusion; and references to those legal materials that had significance and will help the reader understand." 266 Accordingly, if a justice used certain authority to arrive at her decision, then the public has a right to know about it.
With this backdrop, citation to foreign law sources is inescapable. Justices frequently read and use foreign law. 267 Judges may even use foreign law unconsciously. 268 Judges from different nations commonly interact on a personal level and at international judges' conferences. 269 "Courts are talking to one another all over the world," 270 and international and foreign sources inevitably inform decisions. 271 The only issue is whether "judge[s] should disclose-and be ready to debate" their views. 272 And of course they should. If a judge has used foreign law, the public has the right to know about it and question whether, given the comparability of contexts and the judge's reasoning, the outcome is sound. In short, judges must be willing to defend their decisions.
Remarkably, Justice Scalia and others suggest that judges should read foreign legal materials as much as they want, but just not put the ci-UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 tations in the opinions. 273 This position-which appears to come close to advocating deception in decision making-is undesirable. 274 Promoting opaque decisions is unattractive, not only as antithetical to our legal tradition, but because it encourages judges to be arbitrary and manipulative. 275 Indeed, the very concern that Sovereigntists rail againstpragmatic, policy-based decisions-are likely to be increased if judges use foreign materials silently. 276 Omitting key sources that inform a judge's decision from the opinion insulates the basis of the decision from debate and attack: vital means to constrain the judiciary's exercise of power. 277 The citation to foreign law is not only sensible for transparency reasons, it also can serve to legitimize the Court as an institution, both within the United States and around the world. Legitimacy "emanate [s] from the persuasiveness of the arguments and the enhancement of communal knowledge." 278 In some contexts, "foreign and international law are actually necessary to legitimate decision-making." 279 Early on in our nation's history, Americans "self-consciously" appealed to the views of other nations "to win global legitimacy for their fledgling republic." 280 In others, foreign law legitimizes why our courts are doing something dif- ferent. 281 As Frank Michelman has described it, by comparative encounters, we "clarify our picture of ourselves." 282 Lastly, apart from issues of transparency and legitimacy in judicial reasoning, the use of foreign materials is particularly appropriate if one considers dialogical (as distinguished from particularist or universal) methods of constitutional interpretation. Tellingly, despite a fair amount of literature on the topic, those who condemn the use of foreign sources generally ignore the dialogic models. 283 In recent years, theories of constitutional dialogue have emerged "as one of the principal contenders in the quest for a satisfactory theory" that legitimizes judicial review. 284 Dialogical theories are based on "the notion that judicial review is part of a 'dialogue' between the judges and the legislatures." 285 Rather than focusing on interpretative criteria, dialogic models of interpretation focus on the "institutional process through which decisions about constitutional meaning are made."
286
Dialogical models are particularly well suited to justify the use of foreign law, a point generally well accepted. Indeed, the failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to engage more vigorously in international dialogue leaves the U.S. judiciary out-of-step and behind the times. 287 A significant amount of scholarship has emphasized the essential nature of this dialogue and its benefits. 288 "[C]ourts should be talking with each other . . . and even with academics. All are engaged in a search for the meaning of common concepts. The unique authority of each does not speak at UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2007 all to the common substance of their interpretative effort." 289 Melissa Waters has captured the problem in a nutshell:
[T]his is not simply a debate over the relevance of foreign legal materials in the work of the U.S. courts. In a larger sense, it is a debate over what role U.S. courts will play in the emerging transnational judicial dialogue among the world's courts. Moreover, the outcome of this debate will . . . have a tremendous impact on the ability of the Supreme Court and other U.S. courts to influence the emerging transnational judicial dialogue, and through that dialogue, the development of international legal norms on a wide range of legal issues.
290
B. Pragmatic Considerations
This article has attempted to show that the recent criticism of the use of foreign law is much ado about nothing. It would be remiss, however, not to conclude by briefly describing how the use of foreign law sources as persuasive authority is also sensible in several pragmatic respects. First, an "enormous value [exists] in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of others."
291 Practical benefits exist to having judges learn from "the technical competence of their fellow professionals operating in an increasingly interconnected world system."
292
Foreign law can be a "source of good ideas" and provide "empirical evidence about how a prospective legal rule operates in practice." 293 Indeed, "considering and comparing judgments from various jurisdictions makes for stronger, more considered decisions, even if the result is the same." 294 This does not mean that the law of foreign nations should ever control our Constitution, but rather that foreign law informs and aids our Court in its interpretation of our Constitution. 295 "No [nation's] experiences are so different as to reject the norms of equality, liberty, and due process" developed in other nations. 296 The approach is pragmatic:
289. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1163. 290. Waters, supra note 38, at 160. 291. Breyer, Keynote Address, supra note 3, at 266; Jacobsohn, supra note 11, at 1766 (describing the "natural desire to learn from others in order to improve one's own circumstances" and the "logic of self-improvement").
292. Kersch, supra note 9, at 354. 293. Bodansky, supra note 210, at 424-25. 294. L'Heureux-Dubé, supra note 102, at 39; see also Abrahamson & Fisher, supra note 142, at 292 (" [E] ven when [the study of foreign experiences] does not immediately move us into a new stage of thinking, it nearly always affords us a deeper understanding of, and a more balanced perspective on, our own law." (quoting Professor Mary Ann Glendon)).
295. Vicki Jackson has appropriately described this as the Engagement Model. Jackson, supra note 55, at 112.
296. Kahn, supra note 77, at 1162; see also Wald, supra note 8, at 441-42 ("[C]itizens of most countries have common aspirations, a sense of dignity and worth, and intuitions and feelings about justice. Why then would we consciously shut the door to American judges on looking at the law of these countries as it affects the basic human needs and dilemmas of their people?").
No. 2] STORM IN A TEACUP 679
[C]onstitutional law can be understood as a site of engagement between domestic law and international or foreign legal sources and practices. On this view, the constitution's interpreters do not treat foreign or international material as binding, or as presumptively to be followed. But neither do they put on blinders that exclude foreign legal sources and experience.
297
Or put simply by Justice Ginsburg, " [w] e are the losers if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from others."
298
The use of foreign law furthers a second worthy goal. The use of foreign law serves as a means for diplomatic harmonization on important human rights issues. Judges "are beginning to articulate their responsibility to 'help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross purposes.'" 299 As Professor Koh describes it: [D]omestic courts must play a key role in coordinating U.S. domestic constitutional values with rules of foreign and international law, not simply to promote American aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-functioning international judicial system. . . . U.S. courts must look beyond narrow U.S. interests to the 'mutual interest of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime' and, whenever possible, should 'consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes, the development of an ordered international system.
300
Isolationism and parochialism undermine U.S. influence over the global development of human rights. The "U.S. Supreme Court's failure to engage in the international judicial dialogue may [also] cause other nations to be less willing to rely on its rulings . . . [and] reduce[s] its ability to shape the conversation about legal norms." 302 Traditionally, the United States has had an unusual amount of influence on emerging democracies whose constitutional courts would rely on U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 303 But that influence is waning. 304 Those courts are "increasingly looking to judicial decisions from Europe, Australia, Africa, and Canada." 305 To the extent the U.S. Supreme Court "refuses to consider the relevance of decisions from other legal systems, this will eventually lead courts in other legal systems . . . to view U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as irrelevant and isolated." 306 Justice Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia goes a step beyond. He has colorfully "gone so far as to warn that the United States is in danger 'of becoming something of a legal backwater' if its courts continue to disregard foreign precedent." 307 
CONCLUSION
After several years of promising progression towards a meaningful discourse on how to engage appropriately in comparative constitutionalism, 308 recent years have been marred by a steady stream of academic criticism and, at times, crass political condemnation of the Supreme Court's use of foreign law. Let's hope that this criticism has seen its end, because a continued backlash will undoubtedly have a chilling effect. The arguments proffered to categorically bar the use of foreign law in all circumstances are misplaced, at times have the whiff of xenophobia about them, and are inconsistent with a long history of practice. The use of foreign law as persuasive authority is deeply embedded in our legal traditions, particularly in state court constitutionalism. Moreover, the mere citation to foreign laws neither undermines our national sovereignty nor provides judges the means to render unprincipled, nakedly political decisions. When properly viewed, the condemnation of the Court's use of foreign law is much ado about nothing: a storm in a teacup.
Contrary to the thrust behind recent attacks on the judiciary, the U.S. Supreme Court is sensible to cite cautiously to foreign law when it informs the Court's decision. The United States is not so exceptional that it has neither anything to say to, nor learn from, other nations. More importantly, citing to persuasive authority-be it domestic or foreign-when that authority informs the Court's decision is an integral part of what it means to be a justice when writing transparent, candid, and reasoned opinions. One can only hope that we quickly move beyond the parochial, and overly simplified, belief that foreign law should be categorically barred from constitutional adjudication. Instead of condemning the Court for citing to foreign law, academic scholarship would be more productively directed at educating the justices on how best to use and engage with it. For, in the final analysis, the Supreme Court's use of foreign law is commendable, not illegitimate.
306. Harding, supra note 63, at 415; see also Barak, supra note 103, at 27 (suggesting that the influence of American law may be declining).
307. O'Scannlain, supra note 8, at 1897 (quoting Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 287, 291 (2001) ).
308. Koh, International Law, supra note 99, at 48 (noting in January 2004 that "promising signs have emerged that the American ostrich is finally starting to take its head out of the sand").
